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INTRODUCTION

American laws contain thousands of exemptions for religious believers where
legal requirements impinge on religious practice,2 and this tradition of
accommodation extends back to the beginning of the nation and even further to
the colonial era. 3 For example, by the time of the American Revolution, most
American jurisdictions exempted Quakers and other religious pacifists from
compulsory military service if they secured a substitute, paid a financial equivalent,
or performed alternative service of some sort.4 Most jurisdictions also protected
Quakers who objected to oath taking and permitted alternatives such as affirming
instead. The clergy-penitent privilege also had early roots. Not long after the
adoption of the federal Bill of Rights, a New York court construed the free exercise
guarantee of New York's constitution to protect a Catholic priest who refused to
disclose the contents of a confession in response to a subpoena in a criminal case. 6
New York followed with a statutory protection,7 and today the clergy-penitent
privilege is a familiar feature across legal jurisdictions.
All of these accommodations had costs. Exemptions for conscientious objectors
to military service can heavily tax a nation at war, but even in Pennsylvania, with its
large population of Quakers, Revolutionary War era Americans did not force
religious pacifists to fight.' Likewise, when Americans protected Quakers who
objected to taking oaths, they excused them from a practice that was viewed as
essential to ensuring truthful testimony. 0 The clergy-penitent privilege can also
handicap the legal system's discovery of truth by excluding testimony that may be
highly probative."

2James E. Ryan, Smith and the Religious Freedom Restoration Act: An IconoclasticAssessment,

78 VA. L. REV. 1407, 1445 (1992).
3 See Douglas Laycock, Regulatory Exemptions of Religious Behavior and the Original
Understandingofthe Establishment Clause, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1793, 1803-08 (2006).
4Id.

at 1808.

' Id. at 1804-05; Michael W. McConnell, The Orgins and Historical Understanding of Free
Excrcise ofRehgion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1467-68 (1990).
6 People v. Phillips, (N.Y. Ct. Gen. Sess. June 14, 1813), reprintedin PrivilegedCommunications
to Clergymen, 1 CATH. LAW. 199, 209 (1955).
' Privileged Communications to Clergymen, supra note 6, at 213; see also Jacob M. Yellin, The

History and Current Status of the Clergy-Penitent Privilege, 23 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 95, 106
(1983); Developments in theLaw: Privileged Communications, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1450, 1556 (1985).
s Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d 1522, 1532-33 (9th Cir. 1997) (stating that "[a]11 fifty states
have

enacted

statutes

communications'

'granting

some

form

of

testimonial

privilege

to

clergy-communicant

(quoting Developments in the Law: Privileged Communications, supra note 7, at

1556)).
9 See Laycock, supra note 3, at 1810-25, for an extended discussion of protections for religious
pacifists in colonial and founding-era Pennsylvania.
0 McConnell, supra note 5, at 1467 (stating that "[a]t a time when perjury prosecutions were
unusual, extratemporal

sanctions for telling falsehoods or reneging on commitments were thought

indispensable to civil society").
" See Yellin, supra note 7, at 108-09.
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The costs of these accommodations included significant burdens on particular
segments of the population. The clergy-penitent privilege can greatly disadvantage
litigants who would benefit from protected communications. In a civil case, for
example, a plaintiff may lose the benefit of testimony essential to recovery.
Exemptions from a duty of military service increase the burden on non-pacifists
when manpower is in short supply and the number of objectors is significant, as
was the case during the Revolutionary War.1 2 More recently, during the Vietnam
War, the availability of fighters was less of a concern, but federal protections for
conscientious objectors meant that for every pacifist who did not have to fight,
someone else did.13
Like these early accommodations, religious exemptions in American law today
also frequently impact third parties. Some of the costs they place on others are
substantial, some more marginal. Some are widely diffused among the members of
the public at large, and others are borne primarily by discrete segments of the
population. The impact of religious accommodations on others will affect decisions
about whether to adopt an accommodation and the scope and form it will take.
Indeed, religious accommodations always reflect a balance of considerations,
including impacts on third parties, government policy goals, and free exercise
values. Thus, for example, founding-era exemptions from military service generally
required that pacifists secure a substitute or pay a financial equivalent, and
exemptions from oath taking required an affirmation instead. 4 These compromises
reduced the costs of accommodating religious practice and balanced the interests of
the state with the needs of religious believers. Sometimes, government officials will
deny an accommodation because the associated costs will be too high. For example,
during the Vietnam War, protections for pacifists were not extended to those who
opposed only participation in unjust wars, but reached only those opposed to
fighting altogether." An expansion of protections to opponents of unjust wars
could not be administered fairly, the government believed, and it risked leaving the
military without sufficient manpower.' 6
Until recently, most scholarship addressing the costs of religious
accommodation focused on the reach of mandatory accommodations under the
Free Exercise Clause or under federal and state religious liberty legislation
modelled on the Court's past free exercise jurisprudence. Prior to its 1990 decision
in Employment Division v. Smith,' the Supreme Court had construed the Free
Exercise Clause to afford relief when laws substantially burden religious practice
unless the application of the law to the believer is necessary to achieve a compelling
12

See William P. Marshall, Third-PartyBurdens and Conscientious Objection to War, 106 KY.

LJ. 685, 691 (2018).
13 See id. at 703-06.
14 See supra notes 4-5 and accompanying text.
's

16

See Marshall, supranote 12, at 703-04.

See Gillette v. United States, 401 U.S. 437, 455-60 (1971).

17 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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state interest.'" The Court changed course in Smith, and it held that in all but a
few categories of cases, religious believers are not entitled to exemptions from
neutral laws of general applicability." The Free Exercise Clause prohibits
government discrimination against religion,20 but when burdens result from
neutral, generally applicable laws, whether or not to grant relief is a legislative
decision. 21 Soon after Smith, Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration
Act (RFRA), which was designed to restore the compelling state interest test. 22
Four years later, the Supreme Court struck down RFRA insofar as it applied to
state and local law, 23 but RFRA still applies to federal law. 24 In 2000, Congress
passed the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA),
which restores the compelling state interest test to state and local law in a narrower
set of contexts. 25 Many states have also adopted their own state RFRAs modelled
on federal law. 26 Over the past several decades, scholars have debated about
whether strict scrutiny in the free exercise context takes sufficient account of
government interests and what interests should count as compelling. Consideration
of the costs of religious accommodation has been a central feature of these debates.
However, the focus has been on the scope of mandatory accommodations, not on
the constitutional limits to permissible ones.
This has changed in recent years as debates about religious accommodations
have become embroiled in the culture wars. As the tide of the culture wars has
turned against those with traditional views regarding marriage, family, and
sexuality, religious believers have increasingly sought exemptions from laws
reflecting new norms. Claims for exemptions have been met with resistance where
accommodations would negatively impact third parties, such as women and samesex couples. 27 When Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. and a number of other for-profit
businesses owned and controlled by conservative religious believers challenged the

"s The Court articulated this rule in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403, 406-07 (1963), and

affirmed the approach in Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
'9 Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-85.
20 See id. at 877.

Id. at 890.
RFRA was enacted in 1993 and is codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb-2000bb-4
(2012).
21

22

23 City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (holding that RFRA's application
to state and
local law exceeded Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).

24

42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-3(a).

25 RLUIPA, codified at 42 U.S.C.

§§ 2000cc-2000cc-5 (2012), applies to cases involving claimants
residing in or confined to government institutions such as prisons. RLUIPA was passed under
Congress's spending and commerce powers. § 2000cc-1(b).
26 Twenty-one states now have RFRAs. For a list of state
laws as of 2014, see Douglas Laycock,
Religious Liberty and the Culture Wars, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 839, 845 & n.26 (listing citations for
nineteen state RFRAs). Arkansas and Indiana also now have RFRAs. ARK. CODE ANN. §§
16-123-401-16-123-407 (2016); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 34-13-9-0.7-34-13-9-11 (West Supp. 2017).
27 For an insightful discussion of these dynamics, see Laycock, supra note 26.
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application of the Affordable Care Act's contraceptive mandate under RFRA, 28 this
resistance crystalized into a constitutional argument. As Hobby Lobby's case was
pending before the Supreme Court, a number of scholars began to argue that an
exemption for Hobby Lobby would violate the Establishment Clause because it
would deprive female employees of valuable contraceptive coverage. 29 These
scholars found, within the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence, a
prohibition against accommodations that shift significant or meaningful costs to
third parties who do not share the benefited faith at least if those impacted
constitute a discrete and identifiable group.30 A number of additional scholars have
embraced this rule, 3' often referred to as the "third-party harm doctrine"3 2 or "rule

2' The contraceptive mandate requires that group health plans include coverage
for all FDAapproved women's contraceptive services at no cost to plan participants. Women's Preventative Services
Guidelines, HEALTH RESOURCES & SERVICES ADMINISTRATION https://www.hrsa.gov/womensguidelines/index.html [https://perma.cc/T28S-6MZM] (last visited Apr. 15, 2018). In Burwell v.

Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014), the Court granted relief under RFRA to Hobby
Lobby and two other closely held for-profit businesses owned and run by families with religious
objections to covering contraceptives they viewed as abortifacients. The Court held that the application
of the mandate substantially burdened religious exercise, id at 2775-79, and that the government had
failed to show that it lacked less restrictive means to achieve its goal of ensuring that the businesses'
female employees received cost-free access to all FDA-approved contraceptives, id. at 2780-82. Indeed,
the government could have extended the accommodation it developed for religious nonprofits, id. at
2759-60, 2781-82, and the impact of this solution on the businesses' female employees would have been
"precisely zero," id. at 2760.
29 For this scholarship, see sources cited infra note 30.
30 Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an Exemption for

Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51, 52, 54
(2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
ContraceptionMandate: An UnconstitutionalAccommodation of Relgion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.

REV. 343, 349, 361-62 (2014); Micah Schwartzman, Richard Schragger & Nelson Tebbe, The
Establishment Clause and the ContraceptionMandate, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 27, 2013, 2:05 PM),
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/11/the-establishment-clause-and.html
[https://perma.cc/E9M256TD] (last visited April 15, 2018) [hereinafter Schwartzman, Schragger & Tebbe, Contraception
Mandate]; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the
Establishment Clause, PartIL What Counts As A Burden on Employees?, BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4,

2013,

6:04 PM),

https://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-and-establishment-clause.html
&

[https://perma.cc/KLR4-MAT9] (last visited April 15, 2018) [hereinafter Tebbe, Schragger
Schwartzman, Establishment Clause, PartIll; see also NELSON TEBBE, RELIGIOUS FREEDOM IN AN
EGALITARIAN AGE 55 (2017); Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, When Do
Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, in THE CONSCIENCE WARS: RETHINKING THE
BALANCE BETWEEN RELIGION, IDENTITY, AND EQUALITY 328, 329-30, 332-33 (Susanna Mancini
& Michel Rosenfeld eds., 2018) [hereinafter Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?].
31 See, e.g., Douglas Nejaime & Reva B. Siegel, Conscience Wars: Complicity-Based Conscience

Claims in Religion and Politics, 124 YALE LJ. 2516, 2529, 2588-89 & n.294 (2015); Lawrence G.
Sager, In the Name of God: StructuralInjustice and Rehgious Faith, 60 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 585, 599
(2016); Elizabeth Sepper, The Risky Business of RFRAs after Hobby Lobby, in THE CONTESTED
PLACE OF RELIGION IN FAMILY LAW 17, 36 (Robin Fretwell Wilson ed., 2018).
32 Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe & Richard Schragger, The Costs ofConscience, 106 KY.

LJ. 781, 782 (2018).
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against third-party harm,"33 and it has frequently been invoked in disputes over
religious exemptions from laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual
orientation.34
While a number of scholars have adopted this principle against third-party harm,
others have argued that it misreads the Court's Religion Clause jurisprudence,
undervalues free exercise concerns, and threatens many of the accommodations that we
have long taken for granted in American law.35 Part of the debate among scholars has
been about baselines. Those who argued that an exemption from the contraceptive
mandate for Hobby Lobby would impermissibly harm third parties assumed a baseline
that included free contraceptive coverage.3 6 An exemption would deprive female
employees of a benefit that they would otherwise receive under the mandate.3 7 This
benefit is the status quo ante, and the deprivation of the benefit is an impermissible
harm.38
3 Nelson Tebbe, Micah Schwartzman & Richard Schragger, How Much May Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, in LAw, RELIGION, AND HEALTH IN THE UNITED STATES 215,

215 (Holly Fernandez Lynch et al. eds., 2017),
&

34 See TEBBE, supra note 30, at 70; Sager, supra note 31, at 599; Tebbe, Schwartzman
Schragger, When Do ReligiousAccommodations Burden Others?, supra note 30, at 329.
35 For scholarship pushing back against this rule, see, for example, KATHLEEN A. BRADY, THE
DISTINCTIVENESS OF RELIGION IN AMERICAN LAW: RETHINKING RELIGION CLAUSE
JURISPRUDENCE 264-73 (2015); Thomas C. Berg, Religious Exemptions and Third-Party Harms,
FED. Soc'Y REV., Oct. 2016, at 50; Carl H. Esbeck, Do DiscretionaryReligious Exemptions Violate
the Establishment Clause?, 106 KY. L.J. 603 (2018); Richard W. Garnett, Accommodation,
Establishment, and Freedom of Relgion, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 39 (2014); Marc DeGirolami,
On the Claim that Exemptions from the Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause, MIRROR OF
JUSTICE (Dec. 5, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/2013/12/exemptions-fromthe-mandate-do-not-violate-the-establishment-clause.html
[https://perma.cc/NL9H-9FE2]
(last
visited May 10, 2018); Eugene Volokh, Would Grantingan Exemption from the Employer Mandate
Violate the Establishment Clause?, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Dec. 4, 2013, 5:11 PM),
http://volokh.com/2013/12/04/3b-granting-exemption-employer-mandate-violate-establishmentclause/ [https://perma.cc/9EZG-6PTK] (last visited May 10, 2018); see also Brief of Amici Curiae
Constitutional Law Scholars in Support of Petitioners, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (No.

14-1418, 14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191), 2016 WL 183794 at *7-12 [hereinafter
Zubik Amicus Brief]; Brief of Constitutional Law Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Hobby

Lobby and Conestoga, et al., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13354, 13-356), 2014 WL 356639 at *6-9 [hereinafter Hobby Lobby & Conestoga Amicus Brief].
36 Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 30, at 59; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 30, at 374;
Tebbe, Schragger & Schwartzman, Establishment Clause, Part II, supra note 30; see also Frederick
Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, Of Burdens and Baselines: Hobby Lobby's Puzzling
Footnote 3 in THE RISE OF CORPORATE RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 323, 336 (Micah Schwartzman et al.

eds., 2016)
37 Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 30, at 57, 59-61; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 30, at

374-75.
3' Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 30, at 371, 374. Some of these scholars have since clarified
their position regarding baselines. Not every government benefit is part of the relevant baseline for
determining whether an exemption harms third parties. Baseline determinations must take into account
the importance of the values served by the legal entitlement balanced with countervailing free exercise
concerns. Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?,
supra note 30, at 336, 340; see also TEBBE, supra note 30, at 60. The contraceptive mandate was the
right baseline in Hobby Lobby's case because of the importance of the multiple values and interests
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'

Other scholars have viewed the relevant baseline differently. A religious
exemption from the contraceptive mandate lifts a government burden on religious
exercise. The status quo ante is the position of religious believers before the
government acts in a way that restricts religious liberty.39 Accommodations that lift
government burdens on religious exercise restore the status quo. When the
government acts instead to require accommodation in a private setting, like private
employment, it is benefiting religion, and burdens on third parties may raise
Establishment Clause problems.40 However, where all the government does is lift
its own burden on religious exercise, it leaves religion alone, and the religious actor,
not the government, is the source of any third-party harm. 4
Other debates have not been about baselines, but about the value of free
exercise and the measurement of third-party harms. Some scholars who reject the
rule against third-party harm agree that impacts on third parties matter regardless
of whether the government is lifting its own burden on religious exercise or requiring
accommodation in a private setting. However, the burdens that accommodations relieve
also matter. What is needed is a more nuanced balancing approach that gives greater
weight to the value of religious liberty and takes into account a range of relevant
factors that bear on the seriousness of the third-party burdens involved.4 2 The rule
against third-party harm is too simplistic. We also need to look at factors such as the
type and magnitude of the religious burden that an accommodation relieves 43 and the
nature, degree, and likelihood of the harm to third parties.4
While current debates about third-party harms have been about constitutional
principles, two separate questions have often become entangled in these
discussions. The narrower question is the constitutional question. What, if any,
limits does the Constitution place on the accommodations that legislators and
administrators may adopt to protect religious liberty? As I will discuss below, many
of the answers that have been offered to this question are weak as a matter of
constitutional law. The second question is broader. How shouldreligious believers,
government officials, and other public actors take into account third-party burdens

served by the government's rule. Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do Relgious
Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 30, at 336-37, 340.
39 Esbeck, supra note 35, at 623-24; Hobby Lobby & Conestoga Amicus Brief, supra note 35, at
14; Zubik Amicus Brief, supra note 35, at 16-17.
4 Hobby Lobby & Conestoga Amicus Brief, supra note 35, at 13-14; Zubik Amicus Brief, supra
note 35, at 17-19; Esbeck, supra note 35, at 604-06, 613-15; see also Volokh, supra note 35.
41 Esbeck, supra note 35, at 604, 616.
42 See BRADY, supra note 35, at 264-73; Berg, supra note 35, at 51; see also ChristopherC. Lund,
Religious Exemptions, Third-PartyHarms,and The Establishment Clause, 91 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1375 (2016) (sketching some parameters for such an approach).
43 Berg, supra note 35, at 51, 53-54, 56; Kathleen A. Brady, The Disappearanceof Relgion from
DebatesAbout Religious Accommodation, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 1093, 1113-14 (2017); Lund,
supra note 42, at 1379-80.
44 BRADY, supra note 35, at 270; Berg, supra note 35, at 51-56; Brady, supra note 43, at 1113;
Lund, supra note 42, at 1377-80.
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when considering and formulating religious accommodations? The answer to this
question is not fully determined by constitutional rule and includes additional
normative considerations. It is this second question that much current scholarship
is answering in powerful ways. It seems obvious to an increasing number of scholars
that religious accommodations should not shift significant costs to third parties,
and the principle against third-party harm has growing normative force. For others,
however, more factors need to be taken into account and more weight needs to be
given to the burdens that religious accommodations are designed to alleviate.
This article offers new ways of approaching both of these questions. It begins
by returning to America's long tradition of religious accommodation, including
significant sacrifices for faiths that are not our own. Behind this tradition are values
and insights that should inform our answers to both the normative and
constitutional questions about third-party harms.
I. AMERICA'S TRADITION OF RELIGIOUs ACCOMMODATION
When Americans made early sacrifices to accommodate religious exercise, they did
so for many reasons that have had continuing power throughout our history. First, and
most importantly for founding-era Americans, our tradition of religious
accommodation reflects respect for conscience in conflicts with the state. At the heart of
religious faith is the relationship between persons and the divine, variously understood
in different religious traditions, and this relationship makes demands on believers in
their private and public lives. 45 Those in the founding era respected the capacity of
persons to seek the divine and their desire to follow conscience where it leads. Religious
believers, James Madison wrote in theistic terms, enter society with a higher
"allegiance" to "the Governour of the Universe."46 "[Tihe relations which exist between
man and his Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are the most
interesting and important to every human being," Thomas Jefferson also said. 47 Forcing
pacifists to bear arms would do "violence to their consciences," the members of the
Continental Congress recognized in 1775 when they recommended, instead, alternative
assistance to the country. 48 Those in the founding era did not want to compel religious
believers to violate their consciences, and the many religious accommodations in today's
laws reflect a similar concern.

45 For additional discussion of the nature of religious belief, see BRADY, supranote 35, at 80-99.

46 JAMES MADISON, MEMORIAL AND REMONSTRANCE AGAINST RELIGIOUS ASSESSMENTS
(1785), reprinted in 8 THE PAPERS OF JAMES MADISON 295, 299 (Robert A. Rutland & William

M.E. Rachal eds., 1973).
47

Thomas Jefferson, Fourth Report of Rector and Visitors of the University of Virginia (Oct. 7,
1822), in EARLY HISTORY OF THE UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA, As CONTAINED IN THE LETTERS OF
THOMAS JEFFERSON AND JOSEPH C. CABELL, HITHERTO UNPUBLISHED 471, 474 J.W. Randolph
ed., 1856). Thomas Jefferson was Rector of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia. Id at

476.
4S Resolution of the Continental Congress (July 18, 1775), in 2 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL

CONGRESS 1774-89, at 187, 189 (Worthington Chauncey Ford ed., 1905).
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Indeed, for those in the founding era, solicitude for conscience was also part of a
broader commitment to the inclusion of religious minorities in American life. A
"generous policy" of religious freedom "promise[s] a lustre to our country," James
Madison wrote in his Memoial andRemonstrance againstRehigous Assessments.49 It
attracts and protects those who have been victims of religious persecution and
oppression from around the world. 0 Madison repeated the call in Virginia's
Declarationof Rights for all to practice "forbearance, love, and charity" towards each
other." For those in the founding era, this meant making room for those of different
faiths and the practices that make these faiths distinctive. George Washington
expressed this commitment to religious accommodation eloquently when he wrote to a
group of Quakers:
[I]n my opinion the Conscientious scruples of all men should be treated
with great delicacy & tenderness, and it is my wish and desire that the
Laws may always be as extensively accommodated to them, as a due
regard to the Protection and essential Interests of the Nation may
52
Justify, and permit.
America's ongoing tradition of religious accommodation reflects this spirit.
Americans in the new nation also recognized that compelling believers to betray
their consciences undermines moral dispositions essential for democratic selfgovernment. It "beget[s] habits of hypocrisy and meanness," Thomas Jefferson
observed,53 and it weakens moral integrity. When religious believers betray the
demands that define their relationship with the divine, and indeed betray this
relationship itself, their other commitments become more vulnerable as well.
Forcing violations of conscience also undermines the vitality of America's religious
traditions and the moral resources they contribute to the larger country. America's
religious communities have been an important source of public values, and this
contribution has included dissent. Religious diversity has been a central aspect of
American pluralism, and it has been integral to the processes through which we
have continuously challenged, deepened, and renewed our public values.
Unanimity of opinion stultifies our thinking, James Madison and others argued,54
49 MADISON, supra note 46, at 302.
50

d

s' Id. at 303 (quoting VA. CONST. art. 1, § 16).
52 Letter from George Washington to the Society of Quakers (Oct. 1789), in 4
THE PAPERS OF
GEORGE WASHINGTON: PRESIDENTIAL SERIES 265, 266 (W.W. Abbot & Dorothy Twohig eds.,

1993).
53 THOMAS JEFFERSON, A BILL FOR ESTABLISHING RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1779), reprintedin
2 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 305 (facing), 305 (facing) (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1950).
54 See Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr. (Jan. 24, 1774), in 1 THE WRITINGS
OF JAMES MADISON 18, 19 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1900) (arguing that a "[u]nion of religious sentiments
begets a surprising confidence, and ecclesiastical establishments tend to great ignorance and
corruption"); JOHN LELAND, THE VIRGINIA CHRONICLE (1790), reprintedin THE WRITINGS OF
THE LATE ELDER JOHN LELAND 92, 121 (L.F. Greene ed., 1845) (observing that "if there is not a
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and fresh ideas and examples spur its development." Accommodations for religious
believers and groups whose beliefs and practices are out of step with prevailing
norms protect the benefits of American pluralism.
Finally, Americans in the founding era recognized that forcing believers to
violate their consciences risks provoking resistance, resentment, and strife. They
had close experience with this danger,5 6 and it has renewed salience in our time as
fights over religious accommodation in culture war contexts have sparked palpable
anger, bitterness, and resentment. Resistance to claims for religious
accommodation has sparked a backlash among groups who feel threatened by new
rules. There were certainly many factors that contributed to President Trump's
electoral victory in 2016, but a contributing factor was the concern among religious
conservatives that their freedom to follow their religious convictions was under
attack. Trump was not a kindred spirit; his value was as a protector in what was
viewed as an existential battle.58
America's tradition of religious accommodation has reflected multiple values
and insights, and the burdens that accommodations may place on others have also
mattered. Religious pacifists were protected in the founding era, but they had to
contribute in other ways.59 Quakers did not have to take oaths, but they were
required to affirm instead. 60 Both sides in today's debates over baselines point to
something important about religious accommodations. When the government lifts
burdens on religious practice, it protects free exercise, and this is an important
constitutional value. Burdens on religion matter. However, when lifting a burden
on religious practice means that third parties lose statutory entitlements or incur
other costs, this impact matters too. America's regulatory requirements are filled
with exceptions that are designed to balance multiple goods and interests, and
religious exemptions are just one example. However, recognizing the importance of
free exercise should not obscure the significance of other interests that may be

little difference among men, they sink into stupidity"); see also THOMAS JEFFERSON, NOTES ON THE
STATE OF VIRGINIA 160 (William Peden ed., Univ. N.C. Press 1955) (1787) (stating that "[d]ifference
of opinion is advantageous in religion," and "[t]he several sects perform the office of a Censor morum
over each other").
5 SeeJEFFERSON, supra note 54, at 159-61; Letter from James Madison to William Bradford, Jr.
(Apr. 1, 1774), in 1 THE WRITINGS OFJAMES MADISON, supra note 54, at 22, 23-24.
56 See, e.g., JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at 160 (observing that "[m]illions of innocent men, women,
and children . . . have been burnt, tortured, fined, [and] imprisoned" to achieve religious uniformity);
MADISON, supra note 46, at 302 (observing that "[t]orrents of blood have been spilt in the old world, by
vain attempts of the secular arm, to extinguish Religious discord, by proscribing all difference in
Religious opinion").
" Tim Alberta, Trump and the Religious Right: A Match Made in Heaven, POLITICO (June 13,
2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/06/13/trump-and-the-religious-right-a-match-

made-in-heaven-215251 [https://perma.cc/AX4H-Y535] (last visited May 10, 2018).
" See Tim Alberta, Social Conservatives Are 'Over the Moon'About Trump, POLITICO (Apr. 26,
https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/04/26/donald-trump-social-conservatives2017),

215073 [https://perma.cc/N6KB-65UE] (last visited May 10, 2018).
5 Laycock, supra note 3, at 1808.
6o

Id. at 1804-05; McConnell, supra note 5, at 1467-68.
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affected when it is protected. We have never viewed free exercise as an entitlement
that disregards the effects of religious practice on others.
II. THE NORMATIVE QUESTION AND CONSTITUTIONAL VALUES
As a normative matter, when religious believers, government officials, and other
public actors address conflicts over religious accommodation, their goal should be
to seek solutions that avoid or minimize burdens on both religious believers and
third parties to the greatest extent possible. Solutions that take both sets of
concerns into account are preferable to approaches that focus on one set at the
expense of the other. Mutually acceptable compromises are often possible, but they
require both sides to listen to each other and work together in good faith to meet
each other's needs. The approaches that states took to accommodating Quakers
and other religious pacifists in the founding era provide an example. Neither side in
a conflict can expect to get everything they want, but each side should be willing to
address what is most important to the other.
Today, for example, there are certainly solutions to our conflicts over the
contraceptive mandate that can ensure that women receive free contraceptive
coverage while addressing the concerns of religious entities who do not want to
facilitate this coverage. Our fights over the contraceptive mandate tell a very
dispiriting story. The opposing sides in this conflict never came together to work
with one another to develop a mutually satisfactory solution. Whenever one side
reached out, the other side took a step backwards.
This dynamic began when federal regulators finalized the mandate in 2012 with
only a narrow exemption designed for churches and their integrated auxiliaries.'
Despite calls by religious groups for broader relief, the exemption left out many
religious nonprofits with objections to covering some or all contraceptives,
including Catholic schools and social services organizations as well as evangelical
Christian ministries and colleges.6 2 In response to public outcry from across the
theological
and political
spectrum,
President Obama announced
an
accommodation that would retain free contraceptive coverage for the employees of
objecting religious groups but shift its provision and cost to their insurance

61

Group Health Plans and Health Insurance Issuers Relating to Coverage of Preventative Services

Under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 8725, 8725-27 (Feb. 15, 2012)
(codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.130(a)(1)(iv) (2012); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2012); 26
C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713(a)(1)(iv) (2012)). The exemption was simplified in 2013, but these
simplifications were not intended to make substantive changes. Coverage of Certain Preventative

Services under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870, 39,873-74 (Jul. 2, 2013) (codified at 45
C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2013)).
62 See, e.g., A Statement of the Administrative Committee of the United States Conference of
CatholicBishops, U.S. CONF. OF CATH. BISHOPS (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.usccb.org/issues-andaction/religious-liberty/upload/Admin-Religious-Freedom.pdf [https://perma.cc/SHS5-Y4QX]
(last

visited May 11, 2018).
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providers. 63 The administration issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking
soliciting comments on this approach and alternative suggestions.64 Many religious
groups, including the United States Catholic bishops, argued that the proposal still
required facilitating contraceptive coverage by piggybacking it on the health plans
of mandate opponents. 6 However, instead of suggesting alternatives, many groups
simply called for rescission of the mandate or the same exemption for all objecting
religious groups. 66 The government itself only finetuned its basic approach,'6 7 and
religious nonprofits across the country pursued lawsuits challenging the
accommodation. 6 1
In 2016, prospects for compromise temporarily brightened. That May, in Zubik
v. Burwell, the Supreme Court vacated the judgments of the lower courts in a set of
cases brought by religious nonprofits challenging the adequacy of the government's
accommodation, and it remanded the cases to afford the parties an opportunity to
reach a mutually acceptable solution.69 Supplemental briefs ordered by the Court
had brought the parties closer together, and the Court clearly hoped for a solution
that would accomplish the government's goals while addressing the free exercise
63 See Helene Cooper & Laurie Goodstein, Obarna Adjusts a Rule Coveing Contraceptives, N.Y.

TIMES, Feb. 11, 2012, at Al.
64 Certain Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 77 Fed. Reg. 16,501 (Mar. 21, 2012).
65 See, e.g., United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Comment Letter
on Proposed
Rule:
Certain
Preventive
Services
Under
the
Affordable
Care
Act
10,
13
(May 15, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2012-00310353&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2KB-2GCR]
(last visited
May 11, 2018); The Becket Fund for Religious Liberty, Comment Letter on Proposed
Rule:
Certain
Preventive
Services
Under
the
Affordable
Care
Act
6,
8
(June 15, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2012-00310371&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/X57J-M2PV] (last visited May 11, 2018).
Many also objected to dividing religious organizations into two separate types of groups: more religious groups
filly exempted from the mandate and more secular groups that are only accommodated. Catholic Health Care
Association of the United States, Comment Letter on Proposed Rule: Certain Preventive Services Under the
Affordable Care Act 4 (June 15, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS2012-0031-11569&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3Q55-AHPM] (last visited
May 11, 2018); Institutional Religious Freedom Alliance et al., Comment Letter on
Proposed Rule:
Certain
Preventive
Services Under
the Affordable Care
Act 1
(June 11, 2012), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2012-0031(last visited
7633&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/8DMC-K25M]

May 11, 2018).
66 United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, supra note 65, at 3, 17; The Becket Fund for
Religious Liberty, supra note 65, at 3, 9.
67 The government finalized its accommodation in 2013. Coverage of Certain Preventive Services

Under the Affordable Care Act, 78 Fed. Reg. 39,870 (July 2, 2013) (codified at 45 C.F.R. § 147.131
(2017); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A (2017); 26 C.F.R. § 54.9815-2713A (2017)). Later
modifications designed to address concerns about the accommodation's notice requirement were rejected
by religious litigants. For these modifications, see Coverage of Certain Preventive Services Under the

Affordable Care Act, 80 Fed. Reg. 41,318, 41,322-23 (Jul. 14, 2015) (codified at 45 C.F.R.
§ 147.131(c)(1) (2017); 29 C.F.R. §§ 2590.715-2713A(b)(1), (c)(1) (2017); 26 C.F.R. §§ 54.98152713A(b)(1), (c)(1) (2017)).
6'

A number of these cases were consolidated in Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016).

69

Id. at 1560.
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concerns of religious objectors.70 In response to a Request for Information issued by
the government two months later 7 religious groups came forth with promising
new proposals designed to ensure access to contraceptive coverage with minimal
burdens on women and insurers and little or no additional cost to the
government.7 2 These proposals expanded upon and added to the statement of the
Zubik litigants, in their supplemental brief, that separate contraceptive coverage
provided to their employees through their insurers would be acceptable if it was
provided through separate insurance policies with a separate enrollment process,
insurance card, payment source, and communications. 73
However, prospects for compromise were short-lived. In January 2017, in the
waning days of the Obama administration, federal regulators rejected all of these
proposals made by religious groups. 74 The election of Donald Trump had swung
the balance of power unexpectedly in favor of the mandate's opponents, and they
also abandoned their overtures. In October 2017, the Trump administration issued
new interim final rules providing for broad exemptions for nonprofit and for-profit
employers with religious and moral objections to the mandate, and it finalized
these rules in November 2018.7' Employers with religious objections to covering
7o See id.
71 Coverage for Contraceptive Services, 81 Fed. Reg. 47,741 (July 22, 2016).
72 See, e.g., Diocese of Erie, Comment Letter on Request for Information: Coverage
for Contraceptive
Services (Sept. 15, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2016-012346255&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/23ND-AUNM] (last visited May 12,
2018); Diocese of Pittsburgh, Comment Letter on Request for Information: Coverage for Contraceptive
Services (Sept. 19, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2016-012352173&attachmentNumber=2&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/9N6Z-X6SZ] (last visited May 12,
2018); Diocese of Pittsburgh & David S. Stewart, Comment Letter on Request for Information: Coverage for
Contraceptive Services (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS2016-0123-52173&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/Y4C2-KQER] (last visited
May 12, 2018); Michigan Catholic Conference, Comment Letter on Request for Information: Coverage for
Contraceptive Services (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS2016-0123-53288&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/5S3B-DHGW] (last visited
May 12, 2018); Archdiocese of Washington, Catholic University of America & Thomas Aquinas College,
Comment
Letter
on
Request
for
Information:
Coverage
for
Contraceptive
Services
(Sept.
20,
2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2016-012353382&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf
[https://perma.cc/HKD8-FVDN]
(last
visited
May 12, 2018); see also United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Comment Letter
on
Requests
for
Information:
Coverage
for
Contraceptive
Services
(Sept.
9,
2016),
https://www.regulations.gov/contentStreamer?documentld=CMS-2016-01230361&attachmentNumber=1&contentType=pdf [https://perma.cc/3END-8XLZ] (last visited May 12,

2018).
73 Supplemental Brief for Petitioners at 1, Zubik v. Burwell, 136 S. Ct. 1557 (2016) (Nos. 14-1418,
14-1453, 14-1505, 15-35, 15-105, 15-119, 15-191).

74 FAQs About Affordable Care Act Implementation Part 36, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR 4 (Jan. 9,

2017),

https://www.dol.gov/sites/default/files/ebsa/about-ebsa/our-activities/resource-center/faqs/aca-

part-36.pdf [https://perma.cc/E54R-KJCF] (last visited May 13, 2018).
7

Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under

the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,536 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147; 29
C.F.R. pt. 2590; 26 C.F.R. pt. 54); Moral Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain
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contraceptives can choose to use the accommodation developed by the Obama
administration, or they can opt for a full exemption. 6 If they choose the latter,
there is no provision in the new rules to assist female employees to access
contraceptive coverage. The one-sidedness of the Trump administration's new rules
ensures that our fights over the contraceptive mandate will continue along with the
civic divisions that these fights have stoked.7
Genuine efforts to reach mutually acceptable compromises will consider the
types of factors identified by those who have supported balancing approaches to
evaluating the constitutionality of third-party harms. In a process of give-and-take,
the type and magnitude of the burden on religious believers will be relevant as will
the nature, degree, and likelihood of harm to third parties. For example, where
government rules threaten practices that are viewed as critical aspects of faith or
interfere with the ability of religious groups to shape their ministries according to
religious principle, religious believers will be much less likely to budge than in other
types of conflict.
Predictably, then, Catholic and evangelical groups fought hard when the
Obama administration adopted the contraceptive mandate with an exemption that
left out many religious organizations. In the ensuing fights over the adequacy of the
administration's accommodation, these groups continued to jealously guard their
autonomy. Some scholars viewed this resistance as less an effort to protect religious
freedom than an attempt to undermine their employees' access to contraceptives.7
While understandable, I think this view is wrong. Even the accommodation's final
modifications required objecting employers to provide the government with
information that it would use to ensure that employees receive contraceptive
coverage." Moreover, while the accommodation formally excluded contraceptive
coverage from the health plans of objecting employers, the seamlessness of coverage
Preventative Services Under the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. 57,592 (Nov. 15, 2018) (to be

codified at 45 C.F.R. pt. 147; 29 C.F.R. pt. 2590; 26 C.F.R. pt. 54).
76

Religious Exemptions and Accommodations for Coverage of Certain Preventative Services Under

the Affordable Care Act, 83 Fed. Reg. at 57,537, 57,569-70.
" Indeed, numerous lawsuits have been filed against the new rules, and in December 2017, two
federal district courts, one in Pennsylvania and a second in California, issued preliminary injunctions
enjoining the administration from enforcing the new rules. Pennsylvania v. Trump, 281 F. Supp. 3d

553, 560 (E.D. Penn. 2017), appeals flled, No. 17-3752 (3rd Cir. Dec. 21, 2017), and No. 18-1253
(3rd Cir. Feb. 15, 2018); California v. Health and Human Services, 281 F. Supp. 3d 806, 813-14 (N.D.
Cal. 2017), appeals filed, No. 18-15144 (9 th Cir. Jan. 29, 2018), and No. 18-15166 ( 9 th Cir. Feb. 1,
2018), andNo. 18-15255 ( 9 th Cir. Feb. 16, 2018).
s Douglas Laycock, The Carnpaign Against Religious Liberty, in THE RISE OF CORPORATE
RELIGIOUs LIBERTY 231, 241 (Micah Schwartzman et al. eds., 2016) (arguing that "[flor anyone at all
skeptical of claims to religious liberty, and even for many who are sympathetic, this litigation looks more
like an attempt to obstruct the government's efforts to provide contraception by other means than to
ensure that the employers need not provide it themselves").
79 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1)(ii) (2017); 26 C.F.R. 54.9815-2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2017); 29 C.F.R. §
2590.715-2713A(b)(1)(ii)(B) (2017). Religious nonprofits also still had the option of self-certifying

their eligibility for the accommodation and providing a copy of their self-certification directly to their

insurers or third-party administrators. 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(c)(1) (2017); 26 C.F.R. 54.98152713A(b)(1)(ii) (2017); 29 C.F.R. § 2590.715-2713A(b)(1)(ii) (2017).
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that the government insisted upon did closely associate the coverage with the plans.
There are certainly ways to ensure that the employees of objecting groups receive
free contraception without these links, but the government forged ahead with an
approach that treaded on religious group autonomy while many religious groups
also did little to suggest alternatives.
Fights over accommodations for wedding vendors with religious objections to
facilitating same-sex marriage have also been predictably protracted. The conflicts
that have arisen have involved small business owners personally providing services
closely tied to the celebration of the marriage, such as wedding photography, floral
design, and cake-making." The individuals running these businesses have viewed
their services as having a communicative component."' These services not only
facilitate a marriage; they also celebrate it and affirm it. 2 Conservative Christians
who believe that same-sex marriage is religiously prohibited can, and often do,
see the provision of such services differently. For some, the provision of
wedding-related services may be morally neutral, or a recognition that we live in a
pluralistic society with space for each other, or an occasion for sharing the Gospel.
However, for those who see it as impermissible facilitation and affirmation of sinful
conduct, a legal requirement that they serve same-sex couples goes to the heart of
their religious commitments.
On the other side, however, those who resist exemptions from
antidiscrimination rules see a variety of serious harms. An exemption from a
prohibition on discrimination in public accommodations may result in same-sex
couples having difficulty obtaining goods and services comparable to those denied,
and even if their access to comparable services is unimpeded, they will suffer
dignitary harms. Being turned away from service will cause insult and hurt, 3 and it

so See, e.g., Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civil Rights Comm'n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1723

(2018); Washington v. Arlene's Flowers, Inc., 389 P.3d 543, 548-550 (Wash. 2017), petition for cert.
granted, judgment vacated, and case remanded, 138 S. Ct. 2671 (2018); Elane Photography, LLC v.

Willock, 309 P.3d 53, 58-60 (N.M. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1787 (2014).
In Masterpiecc Cakeshop, decided this past term, the Supreme Court held that the Colorado Civil
Rights Commission failed to consider a Christian baker's refusal to design cakes for same-sex weddings
with the religious neutrality required by the Free Exercise Clause. Masterpiecc Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at
1729-32. In rejecting the baker's claims, the Commission expressed hostility to the baker's religious
beliefs, id at 1729-30, 1732, and it also treated the baker's case differently than others where it had
allowed bakers to refuse to make cakes with messages of religious opposition to same-sex marriage, id at
1730-32. The Court's decision in Masterpiecc Cakeshop was narrow. The Court did not resolve the
broader constitutional questions raised by the baker or by other wedding vendors with religious
objections to facilitating and celebrating same-sex marriages. It is unclear how the Court would decide a
case without the religious hostility it identified in Masterpiecc Cakeshop.

s' See Masterpiecc Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1726, 1728; Arlene's Flowers, 389 P.3d at 556; Elane
Photography,309 P.3d at 63-69.
12 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1724, 1726, 1728; Arlenes Flowers, 389 P.3d at 556;
Elane Photography, 309 P.3d at 63, 69.
13

Louise Melling, Religious Refusals to Public Accommodations Laws: Four Reasons to Say No,

38 HARV.J.L. &GENDER 177, 189-91 (2015); NeJaime &Siegel, supra note 31, at 2576-78.
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signals second-class citizenship.8 Exemptions from antidiscrimination rules also
undermine the expressive function of these rules and the values they promote."
Compromises in this context will require each side to make concessions.
Neither side can get everything they want, and each side will need protection for its
most essential interests. One middle course has been charted by scholars who have
proposed an exemption from antidiscrimination rules for small business owners
with religious objections to facilitating same-sex marriages that would be
overridden if same-sex couples are unable to obtain similar wedding-related services
from willing providers without substantial hardship. 6 If a proposal like this is
coupled with a requirement that objecting businesses give notice of their policies or,
alternatively, that same-sex couples have access to resources to identify willing
providers, the most serious burdens on each side will be addressed while reducing
harms to the other side. The overall message of such a compromise will not be
second-class citizenship for either conservative religious believers or same-sex
couples. It will be respect for those on both sides of the culture wars and
recognition of their place within the larger community. Without a solution that
accounts for the interests of both sides, our divisions will deepen and further
undermine larger social and political values we have in common. When James
Madison repeated the call in Virginia's Declaration of Rights for all to practice
mutual forbearance, love, and charity, he linked these virtues with civic harmony."
We need to keep this lesson in mind today.
III. THIRD-PARTY HARMS AND CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS
The constitutional question raised by third-party harms is narrower than the
normative one. Not everything that we should do as a citizen or public actor will be
a constitutional requirement. Limits on religious accommodations that impact
others must make sense as Free Exercise or Establishment Clause violations.
The rationales offered by proponents of the rule against third-party harm strain
the concepts of religious coercion and establishment. Many advocates of this rule
4 Melling, supra note 83, at 185, 189-91; Elizabeth Sepper, Gays in the MoralizedMarketplace,7

ALA. C.R. & C.L. L. REV. 129, 158 (2015); Nelson Tebbe, Rehgion and MarriageEquality Statutes, 9
HARV. L. &POL'Y REV. 25, 38-39 (2015).
" See Kara Loewentheil, When Free Exercise Is a Burden: Protecting "ThirdParties"in Rehgious

Accommodation Law, 62 DRAKE L. REV. 433, 475, 481-82, 485-86, 495, 500-01 (2014); Melling,
supra note 83, at 191-92; Sepper, supra note 84, at 162-65.
36 See Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to Democratic
Representatives, Minn. Legislature (May 3, 2013), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mn-short-letter-pdf--

-d-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/RH24-D5GX] (last visited May 20, 2018); Letter from Thomas C. Berg,
Professor, Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to Republican Representatives, Minn. Legislature
(May
3,
2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mn-short-letter-pdf---r.pdf
[https://perma.cc/LQ4N-PA2M] (last visited May 20, 2018); Letter from Thomas C. Berg, Professor,
Univ. of St. Thomas Sch. of Law, et al., to Representatives, Minn. Legislature (May 2, 2013),
http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/files/mn-main-letter-pdf-1.pdf [https://perma.cc/DKA3-6UVH] (last

visited May 20, 2018).
S' See MADISON, supra note 46, at 303.
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now ground it in both the Free Exercise and Establishment Clauses." They argue
that religious accommodations that shift significant costs to third parties involve
the imposition of the benefited faith on nonadherents" and privilege this faith in
the way that tax support for established religions did in the colonial era." Religious
accommodations with third-party costs also unfairly advantage religious believers
over nonadherents." However, most religious accommodations are very different
than state support for a privileged faith. Religious accommodations are designed to
make room for religious minorities in our political community by giving them space
to follow practices that are out of step with majoritarian norms. Religious
accommodations facilitate free exercise for those who would otherwise face legal
obstacles to practicing their faith. They are not about advancing favored faiths or
enforcing religious conformity.
Likewise, when religious accommodations involve costs for nonadherents, these
costs are not the equivalent of religious coercion. Religious coercion means
something more. It means being forced to participate in or affirm a faith that is not
one's own or to abandon one's own beliefs. Bearing costs incidental to a religious
exemption is a burden, but it is not, without more, the imposition of the exempted
faith on those affected.
Nor do religious accommodations that impact others unfairly benefit religious
adherents over nonadherents. We have protected religious believers in conflicts
with the state because we have respected the capacity of persons to seek the divine
and their desire to follow conscience where it leads. In Smith, the Court held that
the Free Exercise Clause does not require exemptions where neutral, generally
applicable laws impede religious practice, but it affirmed a role for legislatures in
such circumstances. 9 2 On several occasions the Court has held that religious
accommodations need not "come[] packaged with benefits to secular entities."9
Religion is unique, the Court has recognized many times.94 Religious freedom is a

ss TEBBE, supra note 30, at 50, 55; Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note 33, at 215;
Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note
30, at 332-33.
89 TEBBE, supra note 30, at 53; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 36, at 325; Tebbe, Schwartzman
& Schragger, When Do Religious Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 30, at 332-33, 336; see
also Gedicks & Koppelman, supra note 30, at 66 (referring to burden shifting resulting from a religious
exemption from the contraceptive mandate as "religious oppression of others").
90 TEBBE, supra note 30, at 52; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 30, at 363; Gedicks & Van
Tassell, supra note 36, at 329, 335.
91 TEBBE, supra note 30, at 53-54; see also Tebbe, Schragger & Schwartzman, Establishment
Clause, Part I, supra note 30 (referring to "unfair[ness]" of third-party burdens).
92 Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 890 (1990).
93 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 338 (1987); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 724 (2005) (quoting Amos, 483 U.S. at 338).
94 See e.g., Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and Sch. v. EEOC, 565 U.S. 171, 189
(2012) (stating that the Religion Clauses give "special solicitude to the rights of religious
organizations"); Locke v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712, 721 (2004) (stating that "the subject of religion is one in
which both the United States and state constitutions embody distinct views-in favor of free exercise,
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distinctive value. We do not unfairly privilege religious believers when we
accommodate religious exercise; we express this value. Like other constitutional
values, religious freedom can have meaningful costs for others," but these costs do
not, in themselves, make the protection of religious freedom unfair.
The rule against third-party harm also lacks the support in Supreme Court case
law that its proponents often claim. Advocates of the rule often refer to it as a
"longstanding" principle of constitutional law. 6 However, there are only a handful
of Supreme Court cases addressing constitutional limits on third-party harms, and
the Court's holdings have been narrow. As discussed further below, the Court has
indicated that there are limits on religious accommodations that place costs on
others, including accommodations that lift the government's own burdens on
religious exercise. However, the Court has not clearly defined what these limits are,
and a majority has never adopted a general rule that significant or meaningful
third-party costs invalidate an accommodation.
One of the most frequently cited cases in current debates about third-party
harms is Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc." In Caldor, the Court struck down a
Connecticut law that gave workers in the state an "absolute and unqualified" right
not to work on their chosen Sabbath." In finding a violation of the Establishment
Clause, the Court emphasized that the law included an "unyielding weighting in
favor of Sabbath observers over all other interests."" The law required employers
"to conform their business practices" to the needs of Sabbath observers regardless of
the effects of this accommodation on employers and employees.' 00
Two years later in Corporationof the PresidingBishop of the Church ofJesus
Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Amos,'o' the Court upheld an accommodation that

but opposed to establishment"); Thomas v. Review Bd. of Ind. Emp't Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713
(1981) (stating that "[o]nly beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause, which,
by its terms, gives special protection to the exercise of religion"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215
(1972) (stating that "[a] way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a barrier
to reasonable state regulation of education if it is based on purely secular considerations; to have the
protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious belief').
9 See Eugene Volokh, Prof Michael McConnell (Stanford) on the Hobby Lobby Arguments,
WASH.
POST:
THE
VOLOKH
CONSPIRACY
(Mar.
27,
2014),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/27/prof-michael-mcconnellstanford-on-the-hobby-lobby-arguments/?utmterm=.caf7b3d9lbda [https://perma.cc/CTH8-RAWF]
(last visited May 20, 2018) (statement of Professor Michael McConnell) (observing that protections for
free speech, freedom of the press, and other constitutional rights can involve costs for third parties).
96 TEBBE, supra note 30, at 55; Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, When Do Religious
Accommodations Burden Others?, supra note 30, at 329, 332; see also Nelson Tebbe, Richard
Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Reply to McConnell on Hobby Lobby and the Establishment
Clause, BALKINIZATION (Mar. 30, 2014, 8:04 AM), https://balkin.blogspot.com/2014/03/reply-tomcconnell-on-hobby-lobby-and.html [https://perma.cc/FEJ5-9R2H] (last visited May 20, 2018); see
also Schwartzman, Schragger & Tebbe, ContraceptionMandate, supra note 30.
97 472 U.S. 703 (1985).
9' Id. at 708-09.
99 Id. at 710.

.oo Id. at 709.
101 483 U.S. 327 (1987).
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was similarly unyielding. In Amos, Mayson, a building engineer, lost his job at a
religiously-affiliated gymnasium because he no longer qualified for church
membership. 0 2 Mayson alleged religious discrimination in violation of Title VII of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964.103 The gymnasium relied on an exemption in the
statute allowing religious organizations to discriminate on the basis of religion,10 4
and Mayson challenged the exemption under the Establishment Clause.' The
negative impact on Mayson in this case was severe, but the Court upheld the
exemption for the nonprofit activities of religious employers.' 06 The Court reasoned
that the exemption serves the permissible purpose of "alleviat[ing] significant
governmental interference with the ability of religious organizations to define and
carry out their religious missions."107 In a footnote, the Court also stated that the
impingement on Mayson's freedom of choice in religious matters was the result of
the gymnasium's own decision making, not the government's command like the
0
burden in Caldor.
o
Those who argue that third-party harms do not raise Establishment Clause
problems when the government is simply lifting its own burden on religious
exercise, rather than compelling accommodation in a private setting, point to this
footnote in Amos.o' When the government requires accommodation in a private
setting like the employment setting in Caldor, third-party harms are attributable to
the government." 0 By contrast, where the government lifts its own burden on
religious exercise as in Amos, it is leaving religion alone and third-party impacts
result from private decision making."'
However, Amos was a narrow case. It arose in the context of protections for
religious institutions where religious liberty interests are arguably at their strongest,
and it did not reach third-party burdens outside of that context. Indeed, the
employee in Amos was not really a third party at all. While Mayson was not a
member of the Mormon Church, he voluntarily associated himself with one of the
church's religious ministries and was part of that ministry. Those who work for
religious groups understand that these groups will want to shape their communities
according to religious principle. Indeed, the autonomy of religious groups to define
their communities in this way is essential to the preservation and transmission of
religious faiths. The position of employees is more complicated when a religious
organization is providing services that also have a secular dimension and the group
Id. at 330.
Id. at 331.
104 Id. For the current version of this exemption, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-l(a) (2012).
12

13

105 Amos, 483 U.S. at 331.
' 6 d. at 339.
107 I at 335.
10Id. at 337 n.15.

109 See, e.g., Hobby Lobby & Conestoga Amicus Brief, supra note 35, at 13-14; Zubik Amicus
Brief, supra note 35, at 17-18; Esbeck, supra note 35, at 615-16; see also Volokh, supra note 35.
110 Esbeck, supra note 35, at 615.
...Zubik Amicus Brief, supra note 35, at 18; Esbeck, supra note 35, at 616, 625.
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fully or nearly occupies the employment market for particular jobs, as may be the
case with religious hospitals in some regions. However, in most situations, the
employees of religious groups are properly viewed as religious insiders, not
outsiders.
Moreover, while the Court in Amos may have suggested that the government is
not responsible for third-party harms when it lifts its own burdens on religion
rather than compels accommodation by private parties," 2 later decisions make clear
that third-party burdens matter in both settings. In Cutter v. Wilkinson, the Court
rejected a facial challenge to RLUIPA's protections for prisoners and other
institutionalized persons." 3 The Court in Cutterfound that RLUIPA does not on
its face "founder on shoals our prior decisions have identified."" 4 One of these
shoals is impermissible third-party harm. According to the Court, religious
accommodations must "take adequate account" of the burdens they impose on
others,"5 and the Court cited Caldoras support for this principle." 6 In Caldor, the
Cutter Court later explained, "[w]e held the law invalid under the Establishment
Clause because it 'unyielding[ly] weigh[ted]' the interests of Sabbatarians 'over all
other interests.""" RLUIPA's protections for institutionalized persons lift the
government's own burdens on religious exercise, but the Court extended its
precedent in Caldorto this context as well.
More recently in Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the Court repeated its
statement in Cutter that accommodations must "take adequate account" of the
costs they place on others,"' but the Court did not further define this requirement.
We know from the Court's opinion in Cutter that the type of unyielding burden
struck down in Caldoris probably impermissible outside the context of protections
for religious groups. However, we do not know what else "taking adequate account"
of burdens on others means. In her dissent in Hobby Lobby Justice Ginsburg
indicated that she would construe this requirement strictly, and she appeared to
embrace the rule against third-party harm discussed in this article."' However, the
majority in Hobby Lobby did not follow Justice Ginsburg. Instead, the Court
declined to elaborate on the meaning of "adequate account." It did not need to. It
granted Hobby Lobby relief under RFRA because it found that the government
had less restrictive means of ensuring that its female employees received free

112 See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
113

Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 713 (2005).

114 Id. at 720.
115

116

Id.

d

117 Id. at 722 (quoting Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985)).
11s Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct., 2751, 2781 n.37 (quoting Cutter, 544 U.S. at
720).
119 In her dissent, Justice Ginsburg argues that religious accommodations must not place significant
burdens on others, but it is not clear whether she is making an Establishment Clause argument or just
referring to the limits of mandatory protections under the Free Exercise Clause and RFRA. See Hobby

Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2790-91, 2790 n.8, 2801 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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contraceptive
coverage.1 20 The government
could have extended the
accommodation it developed for religious nonprofits with "zero" effect on Hobby
Lobby's employees.121

Those who support the rule against third-party harm have often pointed to the
Court's decision in United States v. Lee,1 22 but Lee is, like Caldor and Amos, a
narrow decision. Indeed, Lee was not a decision about the limits of permissible
accommodations. It was a case about the reach of mandatory accommodations
under the Free Exercise Clause prior to the Court's decision in Smith. In Lee, the
Court held that the Free Exercise Clause does not require an exemption for Amish
employers who object to withholding and paying Social Security taxes on behalf of
their workers because of a religious objection to participation in the Social Security
system.1 23 According to the Court, an exception for Amish employers would
threaten the "public interest in maintaining a sound tax system."1 24 The Court also
added two oft-repeated statements at the end of its decision. In the first, the Court
spoke of the limits of free exercise protections in commercial contexts,1 25 and in the
second, the Court stated that "[giranting an exemption from social security taxes to
an employer operates to impose the employer's religious faith on the employees." 26
A number of scholars have read this statement to mean that third parties cannot be
forced to bear the costs of accommodating someone else's religion.1 27
However, these statements in Lee were brief and in dicta, and the Court never
said that Congress could not exempt Amish employers from withholding and
payment of Social Security taxes if it chose to do so.1 28 In fact, Congress later did
choose to protect Amish employers where their workers are also Amish, which was
the case in Lee.129 Moreover, what the Court warned about in Lee was real
coercion. An employer exemption from Social Security taxes does not just place
costs on third parties. It would compromise the ability of any non-Amish workers
to participate in the social security system. Non-Amish workers would essentially
be compelled to follow their employer's religious way of life with respect to
retirement security.

Id. at 2780-82 (majority opinion).
Id. at 2760; see also id. at 2780-82 & n.37.
122 455 U.S. 252 (1982). For scholarship drawing on Lee, see TEBBE, supra note 30,
at 58; Gedicks
& Van Tassell, supra note 30, at 359; Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 36, at 325; Tebbe, Schragger
& Schwartzman, supra note 96; Tebbe, Schragger & Schwartzman, Establishment Clause, Part I
supra note 30.
120
121

123

Lee, 455 U.S. at 254-55, 261.

124

Id. at 260.
Id. at 261.

125

126 I
127 See TEBBE, supra note 30, at 58; Gedicks &

Van Tassell, supra note 30, at 359; Tebbe,
Schragger & Schwartzman, supra note 96.
121 Indeed, in a footnote, the Court left this question undecided. Lee, 455 U.S. at 261 n.11.
12926 U.S.C. § 3127 (2012).
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Thus, the Court's cases addressing the constitutionality of third-party harms are
few in number and narrow in their holdings, and the Court has never developed a
general framework for analyzing these harms such as the one proposed by advocates
of the rule against third-party harm. This is not surprising. Formulating
constitutional limits on the costs associated with religious accommodations involves
difficult issues and significant risks. Religious accommodations reflect important
constitutional values, and throughout our history we have been willing to make
sacrifices, even great sacrifices, to protect religious freedom. A rule that is too
restrictive will undermine the ability of legislators and administrators to relieve
burdens on religious exercise and inhibit their willingness to do so. It will also
curtail the options available to religious believers, government officials, and other
public actors when they work together to solve conflicts.
In addition, general rules with elastic concepts such as significant or meaningful
harm open the door for bias to influence judicial decision making. Where protected
practices are viewed negatively by judges, it can be easy to see their costs as
significant. A number of scholars have sought to fill in the idea of significant or
meaningful harm. For some, significant harms are "material" harms or, in other
words, burdens that a person would likely take into account when making a
decision about whether and how to act in a relevant way.' 30 Others have drawn on
the Court's interpretation of the requirement in Title VII that employers
"reasonably accommodate" their employees' religious practices unless doing so
would result in "undue hardship."' 3 ' The Court has interpreted "undue hardship" to
mean costs that are more than "de minimis."1 3 2 These scholars argue that our
understanding of impermissible third-party harm should track this standard of
"undue hardship."' 33 Accommodations are permissible when the costs they place on
others are "slight" or "disproportionately small compared to the benefits to religious
freedom."' 34 However, both of these proposals leave little room for religious
accommodations that negatively impact others, and they would invalidate many of
the religious accommodations that we now take for granted. In addition, the
comparative analysis suggested for evaluating undue hardship still leaves significant
room for judicial discretion with the attendant risk that bias and misunderstanding
of unfamiliar faiths will color court decisions.
In past work, I have suggested that the difficulties and risks associated with
evaluating the constitutionality of third-party harms would be best addressed with a

130 Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 30, at 366.
131 TEBBE, supra note 30, at 62-66; Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note
33, at 217. For
the relevant provisions of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, see 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(j), 2000e-

2(a)(1) (2012).
Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63, 84 (1977).
TEBBE, supranote 30, at 62; Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note 33, at 219.
134 Tebbe, Schwartzman & Schragger, supra note 33, at 228; see also TEBBE, supra
note 30, at 62
(stating that the undue hardship standard allows "religion accommodations when they impose
comparatively negligible harms but not when they work to impose the belief of one private citizen on
another").
132
133
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multifaceted balancing approach that gives greater weight to free exercise concerns
and considers a range of relevant factors such as the nature and size of the harm,
whether it is shouldered by individuals or corporate entities, and whether the
government has made exceptions for secular reasons that involve similar costs.135
Limits would not be appropriate unless there is substantial direct harm to a discrete
segment of the population and few burdens on others.' 36 Substantial harms are
serious harms, and courts evaluating third-party impacts should consider the past
experience and expectations of those affected and whether the impact was
foreseeable and can be avoided without substantial difficulty. 3 7 Courts should also
consider whether there has been explicit or implicit consent to the harm.' 38 Other
scholars have also proposed nuanced balancing approaches to evaluating third-party
harms.' 39
The advantage of such balancing approaches is that they can take into account
the multiple values and competing interests raised by conflicts over third-party
harms. Burdens on religious exercise matter, and religious accommodations play an
important role in advancing religious freedom. We have a history of generous
accommodations for religious exercise, and this history reflects a variety of insights
and goods. However, the costs that accommodations can place on others also
matter, and we have cared about these as well. A nuanced approach to evaluating
third-party harms allows us to balance robust protection for conscience with limits
that apply where harms are the most troubling.
However, there are also significant drawbacks to such approaches. One
drawback is the significant discretion that nuanced balancing approaches give to
judges. Multifaceted balances are susceptible to inconsistent application and to
discriminatory decision making. Hostility to or misunderstanding of faiths that are
not one's own can color a judge's evaluation of free exercise burdens and third-party
harms.
More importantly, however, this type of balancing approach lacks a firm
grounding in Religion Clause prohibitions. A multifaceted balancing approach may
be the best way to think about the fairness and appropriateness of the costs that
religious accommodations place on others, and I believe that it is. I have also
argued above that these approaches identify the kinds of considerations that
religious believers, government officials, and other public actors should take into
account when working together to arrive at mutually acceptable solutions to
conflicts. Stable resolutions will reflect their nuance. However, constitutional limits
on religious accommodations are not the same thing as normative limits.
Constitutional prohibitions on third-party harms are not simply our answers to

135 BRADY, supranote 35, at 270-73.
136
137

Id. at 270.

d

13 Id.
139

See supra notes 42-44 and accompanying text.
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what burdens we think would be unfair, unwise, or inappropriate. Nor are they our
answers to how we think a balance of relevant considerations should come out,
whether we would weigh the balance strongly in favor of free exercise, strongly in
favor of avoiding third-party harms, or somewhere in between. Constitutional
limits on third-party harms must make sense as Free Exercise or Establishment
Clause violations.
In fact, the Court's opinions addressing third-party harms point to several
limits with clear foundations in constitutional precedent, principle, and history.
First, accommodations violate the First Amendment if they coerce third parties to
participate in practices that they do not share. This was the prospect that troubled
the Court in Lee. An exemption from Social Security taxes where Amish
employers employ non-Amish workers would compromise the ability of these
workers to participate in the Social Security system and would force them to follow
the Amish way of life with respect to retirement security at great cost to
themselves. The Amish believe that it is sinful not to take care of their own elderly
and disabled.' 40 Non-Amish workers would have to be similarly self-reliant.
Few burdens will involve this type of coercion. For example, an exemption from
the contraceptive mandate for employers with religious objections to covering some
or all contraceptives would clearly have an adverse impact on employees who use
contraception, but these employees can still purchase contraception. Protections for
these employers will increase costs for employees who do not share these views, but
it will not force them to follow their employer's way of life. An accommodation
does not involve religious imposition if it simply makes one's own choices more
expensive. Lots of burden-shifting in American law functions like this. A violation
occurs when an accommodation forces third parties to follow the benefited faith or
to abandon their own.
Accommodations for religious groups present a special case. Accommodations
that protect the ability of religious groups to shape their internal affairs according
to religious principles may pressure employees to follow religious beliefs that they
do not share. For example, the Court in Amos recognized that allowing Mayson's
employer to discriminate on the basis of religion placed pressure on him to qualify
for church membership so that he could keep his job.' 4 ' However, the Court
attributed the pressure to the church and not the government. 4 2 The Court's
intuition was correct. Most employees are, as I have argued above, best seen as
insiders rather than outsiders. The freedom of religious groups to staff their
ministries with religious adherents is integral to their ability to define and pursue
their missions.'43 When the government protects the autonomy of religious groups
over religious hiring, the impact of the group's hiring policies on current and

140

United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 255 (1982).

141 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483
U.S. 327, 337 n.15 (1987); see also id. at 340-41 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
142 Id. at 337 n.15. (majority opinion).
113 See id. at 341-42 (Brennan, J., concurring in the judgment).
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prospective employees is properly viewed as the decision of the group, not the
government. Religious hiring is a church matter, for the church to decide.
Second, religious accommodations are impermissible when they force third
parties to affirm faiths that are not their own. This was how the Court described
the problem in Cddor. The state statute in that case required private employers to
accommodate one type of religious practice at potentially great cost to themselves
and their other employees.' 44 According to the Court, "[u]nder the Religion
Clauses, government ... must take pains not to compel people to act in the name of
any religion."' 45 In this case, the Court later continued, the statute essentially
"imposes on employers and employees an absolute duty to conform their business
practices to the particular religious practices of the employee" who observes a
Sabbath "by enforcing observance of the Sabbath the employee unilaterally
designates."146 What the Court described in this case was a statute that compelled
special recognition of a favored faith at potentially great cost.
The problem in Cador was not that the government had required religious
accommodation in a private setting or that the accommodation would place
burdens on third parties. The government frequently places burdens on private
actors in commercial settings and employment relations in order to meet the needs
of others and to facilitate broad participation in economic and civic life. Title VII's
requirement that employers reasonably accommodate the religious practices of their
employees is an example. What was problematic in Cadorwas the state's decision
to recognize and favor one type of religious need over others in a way that elevated
this need over all other interests.
Cddor and Lee both identify third-party harms that violate clear First
Amendment prohibitions. Religious accommodations cannot coerce participation
in or affirmation of protected practices or force others to abandon different beliefs.
Accommodations that involve such effects do not "take adequate account" of the
costs they place on others.
Proponents of the rule against third-party harm have been especially concerned
about religious privilege. They view significant third-party costs as tantamount to
tax support for a favored faith. 4 7 I have argued that this view misdescribes the
function of most religious exemptions. Religious accommodations that relieve
burdens on religious practice do not confer a special privilege; they make room for
religious minorities who would otherwise face legal obstacles to practicing their
faiths.
However, some accommodations may operate differently. An extreme example
would be an exemption from ordinary rules of criminal law allowing some religious
adherents to directly and intentionally harm others with different views by, for

144

Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, 472 U.S. 703, 709 (1985).
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Id. at 708.

146 Id. at 709.
147 See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
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example, literally "pick[ing] [their] pocket," "break[ing] [their] leg," or worse.' 48 A
protection like this would clearly be an impermissible privilege for a favored faith.
It is hard to imagine such an authorization in America, but unfortunately there are
plenty of examples of state-supported religious violence across the globe.
The more realistic danger in America is a religious accommodation that
benefits a powerful faith while disregarding serious burdens on specific groups of
Americans who are underrepresented in the political process or otherwise especially
vulnerable to adverse decision making. Over the course of our history, we have
made many sacrifices for religious liberty, and in particular cases some segments of
the population have sacrificed more than others. As I have observed above, such
burden-shifting is not unusual in American law. There are frequently winners and
losers as the government pursues its goals and balances multiple values and
interests, and the costs associated with government policies can be unevenly
distributed. Over time, specific distributions of costs may also shift as political
pressures and government officials change. A religious accommodation is not
unconstitutional just because it places significant costs on discrete segments of the
population, even if these costs were the subject of political contestation.
However, what is problematic is religious accommodations that benefit
powerful faiths at great expense to groups whose unpopularity, marginalization, or
other vulnerability to mistreatment makes them disadvantaged in the political
process. Religious accommodations in such circumstances are not always
impermissible. Powerful religious groups can have genuine needs for
accommodation, and these needs can impact other less popular or powerful
segments of the population. However, where religious accommodations place
serious costs on such groups and alternative, less burdensome protections have not
been explored, or the breadth of the exemption exceeds what is necessary to meet
religious needs, we worry about religious favoritism that would not be tolerated if
the positions of those benefited and burdened were reversed.
What I propose is not a balancing test that measures the benefits and burdens
of an accommodation according to some requirement of proportionality.' 49
Balancing tests like this leave significant room for judicial discretion and are
vulnerable to inconsistent application and manipulation. Moreover, the idea of
unconstitutional privilege means more than just a lack of proportionality between
an accommodation's burdens and benefits. Many American laws protecting other
goods are imprecise in this way. Unconstitutional privilege also assumes benefits for
an advantaged faith that disregard important needs of a vulnerable group. Where
serious burdens are placed on unpopular, marginalized, or other politically
disadvantaged groups in circumstances where alternatives have not been considered
or the accommodations that have been adopted are overbroad, such disregard

148 Thomas Jefferson's famous language can be found in JEFFERSON, supra note 54, at 159.
149 Thomas Berg offers a thoughtful defense of such an approach in Berg, supra note 35, at 56
(arguing that "[a]n exemption should not be struck down unless the direct, immediate burdens it
imposes on others are clearly disproportionate to the legal burdens it removes from religious practice").
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exists. Accommodations that reflect such disregard do not "take adequate account"
of the burdens they place on others.
Mississippi's recent protections for wedding vendors with religious objections to
serving same-sex couples provide an example.' As discussed above, one of the
most intensely fought battles in our culture wars has concerned the refusal of a
relatively small number of small business owners to provide wedding-related
services to same-sex couples. These wedding vendors have sought exemptions from
state and local rules prohibiting discrimination in public accommodations on the
basis of sexual orientation, and their demands have been met with fierce resistance.
While efforts to obtain legislative protection have had limited success outside the
reddest of red states, in 2016 Mississippi lawmakers adopted broad protections for
those with religious or moral objections to providing marriage-related services to
same-sex couples.' 5 ' Mississippi's protections cover the provision of a broad range
of goods, services, and accommodations related to the solemnization, celebration,
or recognition of same-sex marriages, including, for example, car rentals and
jewelry sales.1 52 They extend to any closely held business with religious or moral
objections to providing these services regardless of the size of the business or the
impact of its refusal on the ability of same-sex couples to access wedding-related
services in the state.1 53
The protections in Mississippi's law go well beyond the type of conflicts that
have arisen across the country. As discussed above, these conflicts have involved
small business owners personally providing services closely linked with the
54
celebration of the marriage, such as wedding photography and cake design.1
Wedding vendors in these circumstances have complained that the provision of
such services not only impermissibly facilitates same-sex marriage but affirms it as
well.155 Mississippi's accommodation goes much further and also protects larger
businesses offering services with a much looser connection to the marriage's
celebration. The breadth of this accommodation exceeds what religious believers
need. An evaluation of religious need will often involve theological judgments that
courts must avoid. Courts can examine factual claims about relevant secular
matters, but judges cannot second guess a believer's interpretation of what her faith
requires or proscribes. 5 6 However, in this case, it is religious believers themselves
who are defining what they need by the types of claims that they are bringing for
..o MIss. CODE ANN. § 11-62-5(5) (West Supp. 2017) (A challenge to the law has been dismissed
on standing grounds in Barber v. Bryant, 860 F.3d 345, 358 (5th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct.

652 (2018)).
'.'
152
'5
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id.
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-62-17 (3)(c).

154 See cases cited supra note 80.
155
16

See supra note 82 and accompanying text.

See Emp't Div., Dep't of Human Res. of Or. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 887 (1990) (stating that

"[r]epeatedly and in many different contexts, we have warned that courts must not presume to
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relief. Where a religious accommodation extends well beyond the types of relief
that religious believers have sought, it exceeds what they need.
Mississippi's law also takes no account of the real risk of serious harm to samesex couples who want to celebrate their weddings in Mississippi. In a state with a
large population of conservative religious believers, a broad exemption from
prohibitions on discrimination in public accommodations will likely make it
difficult for some same-sex couples to obtain wedding-related services, at least in
less populous areas. Scholars have debated about whether relevant harms go beyond
concrete deprivations to include dignitary harms as well.' 7 I have argued above that
legislatures should take dignitary harms into account when formulating exemptions
from antidiscrimination rules. There are solutions that can mitigate these harms
and also meet the needs of wedding vendors with religious objections to facilitating
same-sex marriages.
However, dignitary harms, without more, should not be the basis for
constitutional limits on religious exemptions. Our fights over same-sex marriage
and related religious accommodations reflect moral disagreements over the proper
understanding of marriage and family. When same-sex couples are turned away by
wedding vendors with religious objections to same-sex marriage, the hurt and insult
they experience are bound up with these disagreements. They are being told that
their conduct is sinful or immoral. These feelings matter, and the occasions for
insult can be reduced if same-sex couples have advanced knowledge of restrictive
policies and/or information about willing providers. However, constitutional
restrictions on religious accommodations because of the messages associated with
protected religious practice do not fit with our commitments to free speech and free
exercise. There will always be moral and religious disagreements in a free society,
and our constitutional tradition values and protects this pluralism even when we do
not approve what particular speakers have to say. Indeed, we have learned over the
course of our history that it can be hard to tell in advance which viewpoints
represent the direction of progress. Our rapidly changing views regarding the
morality of same-sex marriage should give us pause before construing the
Constitution to limit protections for viewpoints we deem harmful or repugnant.
However, where denials of service would result in concrete barriers to accessing
wedding-related goods and services, constitutionally relevant harms arise. In these
cases, there will be dignitary harms, and there might even be situations where
dignitary harms are so great that they threaten concrete harms. Such a threat would
have to be substantial and substantiated, but such a causal link is possible.
However, it is the tangible harm that provides the basis for limiting protections for
religious exercise, not the intangible burden.
By themselves, the overbreadth and likelihood of serious third-party harm are
not enough to make Mississippi's statute unconstitutional. Many religious
accommodations lack careful tailoring to the religious needs they address, and
1s7 Compare BRADY, supra note 35, at 271-72, and Berg, supra note 35, at 55, with TEBBE, supra
note 30, at 133.
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imprecision is also common in other contexts where government shifts burdens to
achieve policy goals. Moreover, we have often made great sacrifices for religious
freedom. What makes Mississippi's law unconstitutional is the combination of
these factors together with a particular type of impacted group. Mississippi's statute
protects powerful religious interests at great expense to an unpopular and
underrepresented group in the state and in a way that exceeds what believers need.
Unlike a typical accommodation, which carves out an exception from a
majoritarian rule, Mississippi's law benefits the majority and pays little attention to
the needs of an unpopular minority. The history behind the Mississippi statute
explains this unusual situation. Mississippi passed its law in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in ObergefeH v. Hodges,'s which recognized the right of
same-sex couples to marry, not as an exemption to an antidiscrimination rule of its
own."' There is nothing wrong with protecting religious exercise in response to a
Court ruling or with an accommodation that anticipates burdensome state laws.
However, in this case, the state extended more protection to religious believers than
they need and in a way that is likely to have serious costs for a minority group with
little power to protect its own interests.
A number of scholars have opposed exemptions from antidiscrimination rules
on the ground that such exemptions undermine the expressive function of these
rules and the values they promote.' 60 I have argued that religious exemptions
operate differently.' 6 ' An exemption from a legal requirement conveys and reflects
the existence of dissent. 6 2 It makes room in America for adherents of different
faiths, and it sends a message of respect for pluralism and difference.' 63 Where
there is continuing contestation over social and political norms, accommodations
can also help to diffuse tensions and balance competing views and interests.
Religious exemptions in state statutes recognizing same-sex marriage functioned
this way prior to the Court's decision in Obergefell.'64
However, sometimes religious accommodations can send other messages as
well. The overbreadth in Mississippi's law together with the real threat of serious
harm to an unpopular minority group also sends a message of religious power and
privilege and a corresponding message of disregard for the interests of a much
weaker group in the state. It is not these messages that make Mississippi's law
unconstitutional. Expressive harm is too manipulable a category to serve as a basis
..
s135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
159 Mark Berman, Mississippi Governor Signs Law Allowing Businesses to Refuse Service
to Gay People, WASH. POST, Apr. 5, 2016, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/postnation/wp/2016/04/05/mississippi-governor-signs-law-allowing-business-to-refuse-service-to-gay-

people/?utm-term=.el6eb346d469 [https://perma.cc/MCB3-6ZM9].
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for limiting religious accommodations. It is also too capacious a concept.
Protecting dissenting viewpoints and practices makes room for messages that
challenge prevailing norms and government orthodoxies. There will be "harms" to
these orthodoxies. What makes Mississippi's statute unconstitutional is the
combination of factors that also sends its troubling message. Mississippi's
accommodation exceeds what religious believers need and threatens serious
concrete harms to an unpopular minority in the state. This is religious favoritism
and privilege.
The Trump administration's new rules providing broad exemptions from the
contraception mandate share some features in common with the Mississippi
statute, but they lack the same combination of features that make the statute
unconstitutional. These rules certainly reflect the new power of conservative
Christians in the Trump administration, and some aspects of the rules are
overbroad. In addition to protecting religious believers in the types of situations
that have generated litigation, they also afford protections where no conflicts have
arisen or are likely to arise. Publicly traded for-profits with religious objections to
covering contraceptives can opt for an exemption, but regulators acknowledge that
no such claim has arisen or is likely to arise.16 Hobby Lobby and other closely held
for-profits that have challenged the mandate have been able to take advantage of
the accommodation for religious non-profits that the Obama administration
extended to them after the Court's decision in Hobby Lobby. They have not
demanded a full exemption,1 66 but the new rules also allow them to choose an
exemption over the accommodation.16 7 If they do so, their female employees will
lose some or all of their contraception coverage.
Whether the loss of free contraceptive coverage is a serious burden on female
employees is less clear. Those working for Catholic non-profits probably never
expected such coverage in close association with their employer's health plan. Nor
would employees of evangelical Christian ministries expect coverage for
contraceptives that can act as abortifacients. Most employees of religiouslyaffiliated organizations work in a religious environment with the understanding
that religious groups will want to shape their employment relationships according
to religious principle. Indeed, as I have argued above, in most cases the employees
of religious organizations are properly viewed as religious insiders, not third parties.
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Even in the case of for-profit businesses like Hobby Lobby, employees may be
aware of the religious orientation of the business and expect this orientation to
shape the workplace. Hobby Lobby stores are closed on Sundays, and evangelical
Christian opposition to abortion is well-known. The view that some contraceptives
can function as abortifacients is less well-known, but Hobby Lobby's position fits
with religious reservations that are familiar. Moreover, Hobby Lobby and many
other businesses opposing the application of the mandate only object to covering
contraceptives they view as abortifacients.' 68 Only some employees using
contraceptives will need or want these types of contraceptives, and for many of
them the costs of contraception will be manageable. Free contraceptive coverage is
an entitlement that bears on women's health and economic opportunity. These are
important interests, but the negative impact on them must be substantial.
A determination of whether third-party impacts are serious must take all of
these types of considerations into account. The nature and size of the burden
matters and so do the past experiences and expectations of the parties, the
foreseeability of the burden, and whether it can be avoided without substantial
difficulty. Religious freedom is an important value, and evaluations of third-party
harms that limit religious accommodation must be sensitive to these and other
factors that may bear on the impact on others.
However, even if we assume serious third-party costs, the Trump
administration's new exemptions from the contraception mandate differ from
Mississippi's law in a critical respect. These burdens do not fall on an unpopular
minority with little power to protect its interests in the political process. While
female employees are the beneficiaries of the contraception mandate and will be
adversely impacted by exemptions, women have taken both sides in the battle over
the mandate. In some contexts, women-or particular groups of women-may be
especially vulnerable to adverse decision making. However, in this case, our
disagreements over the contraception mandate stem from longstanding moral
controversies that divide men and women alike, including women from all
backgrounds and walks of life. In a context like this, it does not make sense to view
women as a disadvantaged or vulnerable group. Indeed, the mandate itself is
evidence of the power of women to affect public policy. An exemption for religious
objectors to the contraceptive mandate makes room for those with minority views.
There have been winners and losers over the course of our fights over the
contraceptive mandate, but both sides have exerted significant power in the process.
I have argued above that the Trump administration should have tried harder to
balance the interests of religious objectors and the women who benefit from the
contraception mandate. Indeed, federal regulators ignored promising proposals for
compromise that were offered by religious groups in response to the Court's
prodding in Zubik, and they chose instead a unilateral approach that met the needs
of religious believers but not those of mandate supporters. Such an approach
16s
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entrenches conflict and ultimately weakens the broader community's commitment
to religious accommodation. Indeed, it also sends a signal that political power is to
be used to benefit the victors and not also to sustain a healthy pluralism. The new
rules, in my view, are too broadly written and take too little account of third-party
impacts. However, these factors alone are not enough for a constitutional violation.
Unless the burden falls on a vulnerable group, an accommodation may be unwise
and unfair, but it is not an establishment of religion or a violation of free exercise.
CONCLUSION

The approach that I have proposed for evaluating the constitutionality of thirdparty harms articulates specific limits on religious exemptions that make sense as
First Amendment violations. Two appear in the Court's case law addressing thirdparty costs. Accommodations cannot coerce third parties to participate in faiths
that are not their own or to abandon their own beliefs. Accommodations also
cannot force third parties to affirm such faiths. I have also argued that
accommodations involve unconstitutional religious favoritism if they place serious
burdens on vulnerable groups without the exploration of less burdensome
alternatives or do so in a way that exceeds what believers need. Americans have
made great sacrifices to protect religious liberty, but burdens like these would not
be tolerated if the positions of those benefited and burdened were reversed.
The Supreme Court has never developed a general framework for analyzing
third-party harms. It has decided few cases and kept its holdings narrow. This is
the right approach. Formulating constitutional limits in this context is a difficult
task involving significant risks. Identifying specific violations with clear foundations
in constitutional law, principle, and history is better than more comprehensive rules
or tests. It is also preferable to the type of nuanced balancing approach I have
advocated in the past. Indeed, careful identification of specific violations with clear
constitutional grounding is itself a way to balance the importance of free exercise
concerns with competing interests, and its advantage is that it does not involve the
risks that attend multifaceted balancing approaches.
My approach has another advantage. Where the costs associated with an
accommodation are high and those impacted are a vulnerable group, my proposal
will push religious believers to engage with those who are affected regarding less
burdensome alternatives, and it will also encourage religious believers to examine
what they really need. The exploration of less burdensome alternatives must be
genuine and in good faith. Religious believers and government officials
accommodating them must consider alternatives that are brought to their attention,
and they cannot dismiss them out of hand. Where alternatives are presented that
clearly involve equal protections for religious exercise and no greater costs for the
government or other third parties, government officials must have a strong reason
for rejecting them. Thus, the interests of vulnerable third parties must be
considered, and third parties who develop and present alternatives will exercise real
influence over the shape that accommodations take. In the past, I have argued for
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an interpretation of mandatory exemptions under the Free Exercise Clause that
pushes government officials and religious believers to work together to reach
mutually acceptable solutions to conflicts. The approach that I propose here fosters
such compromises with respect to the impacts of permissible accommodations on
third parties.

